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Abstract

This study examines the effect of health on SSDI outcomes. The effect is identified by a
new antiretroviral therapy to treat the human immunodeficiency virus. Administrative data on
SSDI applications come from the Disability Research File. According to the analysis, the new
therapy had an immediate and persistent effect on program entry. By 1997, the therapy decreased
applications by 35.2 percent and new awards by 36.7 percent. Among existing beneficiaries, the
therapy decreased program exits through death, but did not substantially increase program exits
for work. By 1999, the therapy increased HIV-related expenditures by $43.6 million.
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I. Introduction
During the past three decades, the US Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
program more than tripled in size, increasing from 2.66 disabled worker beneficiaries in 1985 to
8.95 million in 2014.1 This growth – described by Autor and Duggan (2006) as a “fiscal crisis
unfolding” – has raised questions about whether the program targets the disabled population
effectively. Central to these questions are whether disabled worker beneficiaries are truly unable
to work and, if so, whether the inability to work is due to health versus non-health factors, such
as the demand for low-skilled labor. 2 To address these questions, this study examines the effect
of health on SSDI outcomes, including the choice to apply for and receive SSDI benefits. If
disabled worker beneficiaries are unable to work, and if the inability to work is due to health,
then health should be an important determinant of SSDI outcomes.
To identify the effects of health, this study focuses on a specific yet effective medical
innovation: a new antiretroviral therapy introduced in late 1995 and early 1996 to treat the
human immunodeficiency virus, or HIV. The effects of health are measured by changes in SSDI
outcomes when the therapy was introduced. The empirical strategy has been described by Currie
and Madrian (1999) as the “production function” approach to identification, as changes in health
are derived from specific inputs of the health production process. 3

1

Figures on the number of beneficiaries come from the Social Security Administration Annual
Statistical Supplement 2015 (Table 5.D3).
2
Studies on the employment effects of SSDI benefits include Bound (1989); Chen and van der
Klaauw (2008); French and Song (2014); Parsons (1980); Singleton (2012); and von Wachter,
Song, and Manchester (2011).
3
Currie and Madrian (1999) recommend the production function approach to identify the effects
of health on labor market outcomes. As an example, Garthwaite (2012) examines the laborsupply effects of Cox-2 inhibitors, anti-inflammatory drugs marketed under the brand names
Vioxx, Celebrex, and Bextra.
1

HIV causes acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, or AIDS. By weakening the immune
system, AIDS increases the likelihood of opportunistic infections, cancers, and ultimately death.
Before antiretroviral drugs, HIV was essentially untreatable, and AIDS was rapidly fatal
(Institute of Medicine 2010). In 1981, when HIV was first reported in the US (CDC 2001), life
expectancy after an AIDS diagnosis was just six months (Satriano, Berkman and Remien 2005).
By 1995, 215 thousand people in the US lived with AIDS, and 50 thousands deaths were
attributable to AIDS (CDC HIV Surveillance Report 2001), the eighth leading cause of death
(CDC National Vital Statistics 1998). The effect of HIV/AIDS on the SSDI program was nontrivial. In 1994, approximately 33,000 disabled workers were awarded SSDI benefits for
HIV/AIDS, representing five percent of all new SSDI beneficiaries that year. 4
Health outcomes dramatically improved after the introduction of new antiretroviral drugs.
These drugs formed the basis of a highly active antiretroviral treatment, or HAART. To
illustrate the effect of HAART on aggregate mortality, Figure 1 plots the annual number of
AIDS-related deaths from 1991 to 2001. As shown, deaths climbed steadily during the early
1990s, reaching 50 thousand deaths in 1995. However, deaths declined sharply in 1996, just
after HAART was introduced. From 1995 to 1997, AIDS-related deaths declined by 57.4
percent. 5 HAART also improved functional health, including the capacity and propensity to
work (Goldman and Bao 2004).

4

The figure is derived from the Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability
Insurance Program, 2000 (Table 18). In 1994, 36,087 new SSDI awards for disabled workers
were attributable to infectious and parasitic diseases, but approximately 3,394 awards were not
attributable to HIV/AIDS. To calculate the latter estimate, the number of awards for infectious
and parasitic diseases was averaged across years 1985 to 1989, when new awards for HIV/AIDS
had been categorized as “other”.
5
Duggan and Evans (2008) find similarly large effects of AR drugs on mortality using individual
level data from Medicaid and Medicare.
2

This study examines how improvements in health, identified by HAART, affected the
SSDI program. On one hand, improvements in health should decrease benefit receipt, either by
decreasing program entry among existing workers or increasing program exit among existing
beneficiaries. On the other hand, improvements in health may increase benefit receipt by
decreasing program exits through death. Thus, the effect of health on the size of the SSDI
program is ambiguous.
Administrative data on SSDI applications come from the Disability Research File (DRF).
The DRF reports characteristics of the applicant and details of the application. For this study, the
sample is restricted to workers who filed for SSDI benefits in 1992 to 2000, who reported HIV as
the primary or secondary disability, and who were ages 25 to 54 at the time of application. The
DRF is linked to the Summary Earnings Record, which reports an applicant’s annual earnings
from 1980 to 1999, and to the Numident, which reports an applicant’s date of birth and, if
applicable, date of death. These data are used to measure pre-application earnings and mortality
outcomes, respectively.
The empirical analysis yields several findings. First, HAART had an immediate and
persistent effect on program entry. By 1997, HAART reasonably decreased HIV-related
applications by 35.2 percent and new awards by 36.7 percent. Second, HAART substantially
decreased mortality among existing beneficiaries, but did not substantially increase program exit
for work. For example, among new beneficiaries in 1995, HAART decreased mortality in 1997
by 13.7 percentage points, but increased the share of beneficiaries with earnings above the
substantial gainful amount by just 2.6 percentage points.
The effects of HAART are also examined across categories of socioeconomic status,
measured by pre-application earnings. As shown, the effects of HAART on SSDI outcomes
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were greater among workers of higher socioeconomic status. One interpretation is that the
demand for benefits among workers of higher socioeconomic status is primarily due to health,
whereas the demand for benefits among workers of lower socioeconomic status is due to nonhealth factors. 6 An alternative interpretation is that workers of higher socioeconomic status were
in poorer health at the time of application and that, according to medical research, HAART was
more effective at advanced stages of HIV/AIDS.
The empirical analysis also estimates the effect of HAART on SSDI expenditures. To
derive these estimates, the analysis approximates both actual expenditures and predicted
expenditures had HAART not been introduced. These estimates suggest that, by calendar year
1999, HAART had actually increased expenditures by $43.6 million. The increase in
expenditures reflects that, in the short run, the increase in expenditures due to decreased
mortality exceeded the decline in expenditures due to decreased program entry.
The results from this study contribute to a broader literature on health and SSDI
outcomes. According to this literature, SSDI outcomes are associated with numerous measures
of health, including self-reported global health (i.e. good, fair, etc.), health conditions (e.g.
musculoskeletal, cardiovascular, etc.), and work limitations. 7 However, these associations likely
overstate the causal effects of health, as workers may exaggerate the severity of their disabilities
to qualify for benefits. 8 In contrast to related studies, this study relies on plausibly exogenous

6

Autor and Duggan (2006) question whether the SSDI program serves as employability
insurance, rather than disability insurance.
7
Studies in this literature include Bound (1989), Meyer and Mok (2013), Nagi (1969), and
Singleton (2014).
8
Similarly, the association between self-reported health and labor market outcomes likely
overstates the causal effects of health, since workers may justify poor labor market outcomes by
claiming poor health (Bound 1991). This has been referred to as justification bias in the
literature on health and labor supply (Currie and Madrian 1999).
4

variation in health due to a medical innovation. Thus, the results from this study likely reflect
health’s causal effects.
The results suggest that improving population health may be effective at reducing the size
of the SSDI program. Policies to improve health include expanding access to public health
insurance and incentivizing medical innovation, particularly for health conditions associated with
work-limiting disabilities. As this study shows, such policies may be more effective at reducing
program entry among existing workers, rather than increasing program exit among existing
beneficiaries. In fact, improving population health may actually increase decrease program exits
through death. To address this issue, benefit eligibility could be reevaluated as health improves.

II. Background
A. SSDI Program
Workers who become disabled and unable to work may qualify for disability benefits
through the SSDI program. To qualify, an applicant must have worked at least five of the last
ten years and must be unable to engage in substantial gainful activity. 9 In 1995, substantial
gainful activity was defined as the ability to earn $500 per month. If these criteria are satisfied,
benefits are automatically awarded if an applicant’s disability is listed on Social Security’s
Listing of Impairments. The listing enumerates medical conditions that are both medically
identifiable and deemed limiting of substantial gainful activity. If an applicant’s disability is not
on the listing, benefits are awarded using a vocational grid, which translates an applicant’s
characteristics – such as age, education, and vocational skills – into an award outcome. The

9

A worker must also be younger than the normal retirement age, which ranges from 65 to 67
depending on one’s year of birth, and the disability must be expected to last at least six months
or result in death.
5

likelihood of award increases with age and decreases with education and skills. Applicants who
are denied benefits may appeal the decision at multiple levels, up to the Federal Court.
The baseline monthly benefit – referred to as the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) – is a
progressive function of an applicant’s past earnings. To calculate the PIA, past annual earnings
are adjusted to current dollars using an average wage index. Earnings are then averaged across
years – excluding some of the lowest earning years – and divided by 12. This calculation yields
the average index monthly earnings (AIME). The AIME is then converted to the PIA using a
progressive formula. In 2010, the PIA equals 90 percent of the AIME up to $761, yielding a PIA
of $685. The marginal rate drops to 32 percent from $761 to $4,586 and to 15 percent from $761
onwards. In addition to the PIA, a disabled worker is eligible for Medicare coverage after two
years of benefit receipt, and the spouse and children of a disabled worker may be eligible for
benefits as dependents.
Once entitled, few disabled worker beneficiaries exit the SSDI program through
increased earnings or improved health. In 2010, benefits were terminated for 640 thousand
disabled workers, representing 7.8 percent of all disabled worker beneficiaries that year (SSA
2010). 10 Of these exits, 52.3 percent were transfers to the retirement benefits program, and 35.4
percent were due to death. Exits through increased earnings and improved health were just 6.4
percent and 3.1 percent, respectively.
B. Health and SSDI Outcomes
This study examines health as a determinant of SSDI application and receipt. The link
between health and SSDI outcomes reflects multiple channels. First, poor health increases the
likelihood of benefit award, thereby increasing the generosity of disability benefits. Second,
10

These figures come from the Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability
Insurance Program, 2010.
6

poor health decreases productivity in the labor market, thereby decreasing the opportunity cost of
benefit receipt. Both mechanisms increase the relative generosity of SSDI benefits and, as a
result, the propensity to apply for and receive benefits.
The predictions regarding health and SSDI outcomes are supported by empirical research.
First, SSDI applicants appear to be in poorer health than non-applicants. Using self-reported
data, Bound (1989) finds that applicants are more likely to report work limitations and
previously diagnosed health conditions compared to non-applicants. And, using longitudinal
data, Singleton (2014) finds that disability onset increases the likelihood of SSDI application.
Second, applicants who are awarded benefits appear to be in poorer health than applicants
who are denied. Nagi (1969) conducts clinical evaluations, independent of the Social Security
Administration, and finds that functional health is poorer among accepted applicants. Using
longitudinal data, Meyer and Mok (2013) and Singleton (2014) find that disability onset is
associated with an increase in SSDI receipt. And, using administrative data matched to mortality
records, Singleton (2012) finds that accepted applicants have higher rates of mortality compared
to rejected applicants. These findings suggest that the SSDI program is somewhat effective at
screening applicants based on health.
Although poor health is associated with SSDI outcomes, these associations may be biased
measures of health’s causal effects. The biases are similar to those discussed in the literature on
health and labor market outcomes (Bound 1991; Currie and Madrian 1999). On one hand, the
associations between SSDI outcomes and subjective measures of health – such as global health
and disability status – likely overstate the effects health, as workers may exaggerate the severity
of their disabilities to qualify for benefits. On the other hand, the associations between SSDI
outcomes and objective measures of health – such as diagnosed health conditions and subsequent
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mortality – likely understate the effects of health, since not all health measures affect work
capacity.
C. SSDI and HIV/AIDS
To examine the effect of health on SSDI outcomes, this study focuses on the introduction
of HAART in late 1995 and early 1996. HAART is a combination of antiretroviral drugs to treat
HIV. In 1981, when HIV was first reported in the US, HIV was essentially untreatable, and
AIDS was quickly fatal. By 1996, HIV/AIDS became the eighth leading cause of death (CDC
National Vital Statistics 1998). Health outcomes drastically improved, however, with the
introduction of HAART. As studies show, HAART decreased mortality by 70 percent (Evans
and Duggan 2008) and improved functional health and work capacity (Goldman and Bao 2004).
This study examines how improvements in health, identified from the introduction of HAART,
affected the SSDI program.
Mentioned above, an applicant can qualify for benefits by meeting or exceeding the
requirements outlined in Social Security’s Listing of Impairments. The listing for HIV/AIDS,
last updated in 1993, requires an applicant to be medically diagnosed with HIV or AIDS and to
exhibit at least one opportunistic infection such as shingles, pneumonia, and certain skin cancers
(Institute of Medicine 2010). An applicant who does not meet the listing may still qualify for
benefits through the vocational grid. Importantly, the eligibility standards for HIV/AIDS did not
change once HAART was introduced.

III. Data
A. Disability Research File

8

Administrative data on SSDI applications come from Disability Research File (DRF).
All applications for SSDI benefits are recorded in the DRF once the case is adjudicated. The file
includes characteristics of the applicant, including age, sex, and educational attainment. The file
also includes information about the disability application, including the date of file, the primary
and secondary disabilities, and the award outcome.
The DRF has been merged to two additional data files used in the analysis. The first is
the Summary Earnings Record, which reports earnings annually from 1980 to 1999. The data
are compiled from W-2 forms filed with the Internal Revenue Service. Earnings are reported up
to the Social Security taxable maximum, beyond which payroll taxes are not levied. In 1994, the
taxable maximum was $60,600. The second data file is the Numident, which contains an
applicant’s date of birth and, if applicable, date of death. Dates of death are compiled primarily
from vital statistics of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention.
For this study, several restrictions are imposed on the DRF. First, the sample is restricted
to applications filed in 1992 to 2000. These years adequately span the introduction of HAART,
which occurred in late 1995 and early 1996. Second, the sample is limited to applications by
disabled workers, thus excluding applications by disabled spouses and widows. Third, the
sample is restricted to applicants who report HIV/AIDS as the primary or secondary disability.
This addresses the concern that workers continue to apply for SSDI benefits, but report
HIV/AIDS as a secondary disability, rather than a primary disability, once HAART becomes
available. Finally, the sample is restricted to applicants who are aged 25 to 54 at the time of
application. This limits the analysis to applicants of working age who have some work history.
The remaining sample contains approximately 250 thousand applications.
B. Sample Summary

9

Summary statistics of HIV-related applicants are reported in the first column of Table 1.
To characterize applicants just before HAART was introduced, the sample is limited to
applicants in 1994. Listed first are demographic characteristics, including age, sex, and race.
For comparison, similar characteristics for the general population were tabulated using the 1994
March Supplement of the Current Population Survey. 11 In comparison to the population, HIVrelated applicants are slightly younger (36.9 versus 38.2), are more likely to be male (88.3
percent versus 49.4 percent), and less likely to be white (79.8 percent versus 92.7). Applicants
also have lower earnings prior to application ($14.7 thousand versus $22.1 thousand). 12
To examine educational attainment, 18.0 percent of applicants in 1994 must be omitted
due to missing values. Summary statistics of the remaining sample are reported in column two
of Table 1. The distribution of educational attainment is shown in the final three columns of
Table 1, which report summary statistics across three categories of education. The categories
are less than a high school diploma, a high school diploma only, and a college degree.
According to the sample counts in the final three columns, applicants appear to be less educated
than the general population. In particular, applicants are more likely to have less than a high
school diploma (21.6 percent versus 13.1 percent), more likely to have a high school diploma
only (65.3 percent versus 33.9 percent), and substantially less likely to have a college degree
(12.9 percent versus 33.9 percent).
Table 1 also reports information about the socioeconomic status and health of HIVrelated applicants. As shown in the first column, 67.4 percent of SSDI applicants applied
concurrently for disability benefits through the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. A

11

Statistics are tabulated using sampling weights.
Pre-application earnings are calculated as the average of three years of annual earnings prior to
the calendar year of application.
12
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concurrent application is an indicator of low socioeconomic status, since the medical eligibility
standards of both programs are the same, but the SSI program requires beneficiaries to have low
income and assets. Nearly all applications reported HIV as the primary disability (92.1 percent)
and reported HIV-related symptoms at the time of application (83.9 percent, respectively). The
benefit award rate was 70.5 percent at the initial determination and 78.5 percent after the appeals
process. And in regards to subsequent mortality, 24.0 percent of applicants were deceased
within one calendar year of application, and 40.9 percent were deceased within two calendar
years.
Summary statistics by educational attainment are reported in the last three columns of
Table 1. As shown, higher educational attainment is associated poorer health at the time of
application. In comparison to applications with no high school diploma, applicants with a
college degree were more likely to report HIV-related symptoms (92.2 percent versus 74.1
percent) and more likely to be deceased within two calendar years of application (50.3 percent
versus 31.1 percent). Poor health is also evident by higher award rates at the initial level (85.8
percent versus 56.7 percent) and after the appeals process (91.0 percent versus 68.1 percent).
The negative association between education and health – which is evident among all
SSDI applicants, not just those related to HIV (Singleton 2014) – suggests that more educated
workers apply for benefits at later stages of disease. One possibility is that, despite poorer
health, the gains from employment are greater for more educated workers. This is evident by
average annual earnings reported in Table 1: applicants with a college degree earned $26.4
thousand prior to application, whereas applicants with less than a high school diploma earned
just $8.1 thousand. Another possibility is that benefits are relatively less generous for more
educated workers. Educated workers face a lower likelihood of award, particularly when the
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award decision is based on the vocational grid, and receive benefits that are relatively less
generous, due to a combination of higher earnings and a progressive benefit formula.

IV. Program Entry
The empirical objective is to examine how HAART affected SSDI outcomes. The
analysis first examines the effect of HAART on program entry, measured by both applications
and new awards attributable to HIV/AIDS. Changes in applications are a better indicator of
benefit demand, since the application decision rests solely with workers. The award decision,
however, is ultimately determined by the Social Security Administration.
A. Applications
The effect of HAART on HIV-related applications is examined graphically in Figure 2.
Using data from the DRF, the figure plots the number of HIV-related applications annually from
1992 to 2000. As shown, applications decreased steadily during the early 1990s, but decreased
sharply in 1996 and 1997, just after the introduction of HAART. Applications continued to
decline after 1997, but at a much lower rate. The figure suggests that HAART had an immediate
and persistent effect on HIV-related applications.
To quantify the effect, it is necessary to predict how applications would have evolved in
the absence of HAART. One method of prediction is to extrapolate the trend before 1995 to
after, corresponding to periods before and after HAART. For example, from 1993 to 1995,
applications decreased an average of 2,186 per year, reaching 31,264 in 1995. If this trend
would have continued, applications would have decreased to 29,078 and 26,892 in 1996 and
1997, respectively. However, the actual number of applications was 26,609 and 17,435 in 1996
and 1997, respectively. If the difference between the actual and predicted numbers is attributable
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to HAART, then the therapy reasonably decreased HIV-related applications in 1997 by 9,457, or
35.2 percent.
One concern with this estimate is that the sharp decline in applications may be due to
systematic factors that affected all applications, not just those related to HIV/AIDS. If so, the
estimate would overstate the causal effect of HAART. To address this concern, Figure 2 plots
the number of all SSDI applications annually from 1992 to 2000. As shown, the number of
applications trended downward from 1994 to 1998, but did not decrease sharply after 1995. This
suggests that systemic factors cannot account for the decline in HIV-related applications after
1995.
An important consideration is whether the effect of HAART on applications varies across
types of workers. For two reasons, the effect should be greater among workers of higher
socioeconomic status. First, according to medical research, HAART was most effective at more
advanced stages of HIV/AIDS. This means that the effect of HAART on health should be
greatest among applicants of higher socioeconomic status, who appear to be in the poorer health
at the time of application (Table 1). Second, the gains from employment are greater among
applicants of higher socioeconomic status, evident by higher pre-application earnings (Table 2).
This means that, as health improves, workers of higher socioeconomic status would be less likely
to apply for SSDI benefits.
To test this prediction, Table 2 reports the number of applications by categories of
socioeconomic status and health. For each category, the table reports the number of applications
in 1993 and 1995 and the average annual decline between these two years. To predict the
number of applications in 1997, twice the average decline between 1993 and 1995 is added to the
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number of applications in 1995. The difference between the actual and predicted number of
applications in 1997 is taken as the causal effect of HAART.
As expected, the effect of HAART on applications was greater among workers of higher
socioeconomic status. This is most evident across categories of pre-application earnings.
Among the highest earnings category – $20 thousand or more – HAART decreased applications
by approximately 59.7 percent. Among the lowest earnings category – less than $10 thousand –
HAART decreased applications by just 20.8 percent. Another indicator of socioeconomic status
is a concurrent application for SSI benefits. As shown, HAART decreased applications for SSDI
benefits singly by 40.7 percent, but decreased concurrent applications by just 27.9 percent.
The decline in applications was also greater among categories of poorer health. Poor
health is measured by whether the applicant reported HIV as the primary disability and by
whether the applicant exhibited HIV-related symptoms at the time of application. While the
results by health are consistent with the predictions above, as poor health is associated with
higher socioeconomic status (Table 1), the results may also reflect the direct of HAART on
health, independent of socioeconomic status.
B. Awards
The effect of HAART on benefit awards is estimated using the same methodology above.
To estimate the number of awards each year, the number of HIV-related applications plotted in
Figure 2 is factored by the annual award rate for HIV-related applications plotted in Figure 3.
As Figure 3 shows, the award rate for HIV-related applications decreased gradually from 1992
to 2000. Based on these figures, the number of awards in 1993 and 1995 was 27,867 and 21,353,
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respectively. 13 Thus, new awards decreased by 3,257 per year before HAART was introduced.
If this trend had continued in the absence of HAART, the number of new awards in 1996 and
1997 would have been 18,096 and 14,839, respectively. However, the actual number of awards
in 1996 and 1997 was 26,630 and 9,397, respectively. Thus, HAART reasonably decreased the
number of HIV-related awards in 1997 by 5,442, or 36.7 percent.
C. Award Rate
According to the analysis above, the introduction HAART had an immediate effect on
HIV-related applications and awards. To attribute these changes to improvements in health, it is
necessary to rule out alternative mechanisms. One alternative mechanism is that the Social
Security Administration tightened eligibility standards after HAART was introduced, and
tightened standards independently decreased both applications and awards. Although the
statutory standards of eligibility did not change, as described above, the standards may have been
applied more stringently nonetheless.
One measure of stringency is the rate of benefit award. As shown in Figure 3, the rate of
award decreased from 1992 to 2000. While this decrease may reflect increased stringency, it
may also reflect a change in the composition of applicants due to improvements in health.
Indeed, as Table 2 shows, HAART decreased applications among workers who were more likely
to be awarded benefits. To measure a systemic change in stringency, while simultaneously
controlling for the composition of applications, the following model is estimated:
𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖 .
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These estimates are lower than the estimate presented in the introduction of 33 thousand new
beneficiaries in 1994. The estimates here are limited to ages 25 to 54 and the award rate does not
include appeals beyond the administrative law judge.
15

The outcome 𝑌𝑖𝑖 represents the award outcome, equaling one if benefits are awarded and zero

otherwise. The variable 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 is the calendar year, which controls for a linear trend in the award
rate. The variable 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 indicates periods after HAART was introduced, equaling one for

years after 1995 and zero otherwise. The vector 𝑋 contains characteristics of the applicant,
including age, sex, race, state-fixed effects, and pre-application earnings.

The coefficient of interest is 𝛾, which represents the differential change in the award rate

after HAART relative to the pre-existing trend. To measure the change in the award rate from

1995 to 1997 relative to the pre-existing trend from 1993 to 1995 – consistent with Tables 2 and
3 – the sample is restricted to years 1993, 1995, and 1997. Without demographic controls, the
estimate of 𝛾 reflects both tightened eligibility standards and changes in the composition of

applications. The estimate, reported in the in the first column of Table 3, is -4.5 percentage
points and statistically significant. With demographic controls, the estimate of 𝛾 reflects

tightened eligibility standards, controlling for changes in the composition of applications. In this
case, the estimate, reported in the second column of Table 3, is -0.22 percentage points and
statistically insignificant. Together, the results suggest that the differential decline in the award
rate after HAART was introduced, of 4.5 percentage points, is due largely to a change in the
composition of applicants, not tightened eligibility standards.

V. Program Exit
The introduction of HAART may have affected program exit among existing
beneficiaries. On one hand, improvements in health could increase program exit by increasing
the capacity and propensity to work. On the other hand, improvements in health could decrease
program exit through death. Thus, the net effect of HAART on program exit is ambiguous.
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The analysis focuses on disabled workers who were awarded benefits just before HAART
was introduced. Table 4 reports summary statistics of new HIV-related beneficiaries by year of
award. This allows for a comparison of new beneficiaries in 1994 to all applicants, regardless of
award outcome, reported in Table 1. Compared to all applicants, new beneficiaries were more
likely to report HIV-related symptoms at the time of application (96.6 percent versus 83.9
percent) and had greater earnings prior to application ($17.1 thousand versus $14.7 thousand).
These results are consistent with previous findings that accepted applicants are in poorer health –
and had greater attachment to the labor market – compared to rejected applicants (Singleton
2012). New beneficiaries are also more likely to be older (37.1 years versus 36.8 years), male
(90.5 percent versus 87.6 percent), and white (58.2 percent versus 51.6 percent).
A. Mortality
Mortality outcomes of HIV-related beneficiaries are reported in Table 5. Statistics are
reported separately by year of award, from 1992 to 1995, and by years since award, from zero to
four. Years since award correspond to calendar years, with year zero as the year of award. Each
statistic represents the cumulative share of beneficiaries who were deceased at the end each year,
and the shaded region indicates years 1995 and earlier, before HAART was introduced.
The 1995 cohort is considered the last cohort to have been awarded benefits before
HAART. As shown, mortality was initially high in years one and two, but decreased
substantially thereafter. For example, 40.4 percent of beneficiaries died during years zero and
one, but only 11.1 percent of beneficiaries died in years three and four. The simultaneous
introduction of HAART and decrease in the marginal rate of mortality suggests that HAART
decreased program exits through death.
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To quantify this effect, it is necessary to predict how mortality would have changed in the
absence of HAART. One method is to use mortality outcomes of earlier award cohorts, which
were exposed to HAART at later years since award. For example, the 1994 cohort can be used
as a comparison group for the 1995 cohort. In year zero, neither cohort was exposed to HAART;
but, in year one, the 1995 cohort was exposed to HAART, while the 1994 cohort was not. Thus,
the difference in mortality between cohorts, but within the same year since award, may be
interpreted as the causal effect of HAART.
For the estimator to be unbiased, it must be assumed that the two cohorts would have had
similar rates of mortality in the absence of HAART. This assumption is reasonably valid in
regards to the cohorts in 1994 and 1995. Both cohorts have similar observable characteristics,
including age, race, and pre-application earnings (Table 4), and both cohorts had similar rates of
mortality in year zero, before HAART was introduced (Table 5). Thus, subsequent differences
in mortality are likely due to HAART.
As shown, mortality in year one reached 40.4 percent among the 1995 cohort and 47.9
percent among the 1994 cohort. Thus, HAART reasonably decreased year-one mortality among
the 1995 cohort by 7.5 percentage points. In subsequent years, the difference in mortality
increases, despite the fact that the 1994 cohort was exposed to HAART in year two since award.
In years two through four, the difference in mortality reaches 13.7 percent, 13.9 percent, and
13.1 percent, respectively.
Using the same methodology, Table 5 reveals two additional findings. First, the effect of
HAART on mortality appears larger after many years of treatment. For example, to identify the
effect of HAART after three years of treatment, the 1992 cohort can be used as the comparison
group for the 1995 cohort. By year three since award, the 1995 cohort had three years of
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exposure, while the 1992 cohort had none. As shown, the difference in mortality reached 20.5
percentage points.
However, in this case, mortality of the 1992 cohort likely understates mortality of 1995
cohort had HAART not been introduced – a violation of the identification assumption described
above. One reason is that, according to Table 4, the health of new beneficiaries became
progressively worse from 1992 to 1995, evident by the share of beneficiaries reporting HIVrelated symptoms. Another reason is that, according to Table 5, year-zero mortality was lower
among earlier cohorts. If mortality of the 1992 cohort indeed understates mortality of 1995
cohort, then the differences in mortality between the two cohorts likely understate the causal
effects of HAART.
A second finding is that the effect of HAART appears smaller among earlier award
cohorts, which were exposed to HAART multiple years after benefit award. For example, when
HAART is introduced in year two since award, the effect in year three is just -0.1 percentage
points. This estimate is derived using the 1994 cohort as the treatment group and the 1993
cohort as the comparison group. Additionally, when HAART is introduced in year three since
award, the effect in year four is -3.1 percentage points. This estimate is derived using the 1993
as the treatment group and the 1992 cohort as the comparison group.
B. Substantial Gainful Activity
While declines in mortality should decrease program exits, improvements in work
capacity should increase exits. Unfortunately, the DRF does not report terminations of SSDI
benefits due to improved health or increased employment. As an alternative, program exit is
measured by the share of beneficiaries engaged in substantial gainful activity. Gainful activity is
defined by earnings, so engaging in substantial gainful activity can measured using the Summary
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Earnings Record. Because earnings are reported annually, but gainful activity is defined
monthly, the latter is measured on an annualized basis. For example, the substantial gainful
amount in 1995 was $500 per month, so the annualized measure is $6,000 that year.
Summary statistics of substantial gainful activity are reported in the right panel of Table
5. The columns correspond to award cohorts, and the rows correspond to years since award.
Each statistic represents the share of beneficiaries engaged in gainful activity during a calendar
year, not adjusted for mortality. Gainful activity is highest in year zero, which may reflect
earnings before benefit award. Gainful activity is considerably lower in period one, which
corresponds to the first full calendar year after benefit award.
Among the 1995 cohort, 3.6 percent of beneficiaries were engaged in substantial gainful
activity in year one. This figure increases slightly in subsequent years, reaching 4.6 percent, 5.8
percent, and 5.3 percent in years two, three, and four, respectively. While the increase in
substantial gainful activity may reflect improvements in health due to HAART, it may also
reflect that health may improve after a disability award, independent of the introduction of
HAART.
To identify the effect of HAART, the analysis again uses earlier cohorts as comparison
groups for later cohorts. Using this methodology, the data suggest that HAART may have
increased gainful activity among existing beneficiaries, but the magnitude of the effect is
relatively small. For example, in year one, the difference in gainful activity between the 1994
and 1995 cohorts was just 1.0 percentage point. In year two and three, the difference increased
slightly to 2.6 and 3.0 percentage points, respectively. Thus, the data do not suggest that
HAART substantially increased program exit for work.
C. Effects by Pre-Application Earnings
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As with program entry, the effects of HAART on program exit should be greater among
workers of higher socioeconomic status. To examine this prediction, Table 6 reports summary
statistics on mortality and gainful activity for three categories of pre-application earnings. Panel
A corresponds to earnings less than $10 thousand; Panel B corresponds to earnings from $10
thousand to $20 thousand; Panel C corresponds to earnings greater than $20 thousand. Each
panel is constructed similarly to Table 5.
In general, the effect of HAART on mortality appears greater among workers with higher
pre-application earnings. The immediate effect can be measured by comparing the 1994 and
1995 cohorts in year one. As shown, the difference in mortality is 5.9, 7.4, and 9.5 percentage
points in panels A, B, and C, respectively. The long-run effect can be measured by comparing
the 1992 and 1995 cohorts in year four. In this case, the difference in mortality is 17.3, 24.1, and
26.8 percentage points, respectively. 14
The effect of HAART on gainful activity also appears greater among workers with higher
pre-application earnings. Again, the long-run effect can be measured as the difference in gainful
activity between the 1992 and 1995 cohorts in year four. As shown, this difference is 2.3, 4.5,
and 5.1 percentage points in panels A, B, and C, respectively. Taken together, the results suggest
that the effects of health on program exit are greatest among workers of higher socioeconomic
status.

VI. Expenditures
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As previously noted, year-zero mortality in Table 5 increased from earlier to later cohorts. As
Table 6 shows, this increase occurs predominately in panels A and B, corresponding to
categories of low pre-application earnings. This means that differences in mortality in these
panels likely understate the causal effects of HAART.
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The effect of HAART on SSDI receipt also affects program expenditures. To estimate
this effect, Panel A of Table 7 reports actual expenditures by award cohort and year of award.
The calculations assume that beneficiaries receive the PIA every month, beginning with the
month of benefit award. If a beneficiary dies, the monthly benefit equals zero, beginning with
the month of death.
Panel B reports predicted expenditures after 1995 had HAART not been introduced.
These predictions are based on three observations of actual expenditures in panel A. First, from
the 1992 to 1995 cohort, year-zero expenditures decreased an average of eight percent. This
trend is extrapolated to cohorts 1996 through 1999. Second, from year zero to one, expenditures
of the 1994 cohort increased 30.1 percent. This increase is used to predict year-one expenditures
for cohorts 1995 and later. Finally, after year one, expenditures of the 1992 and 1993 cohorts
decreased annually by approximately 36 percent. This decrease is used to predict expenditures
in year two and later, from calendar years 1996 through 1999.
The effect of HAART on expenditures is calculated as the difference between actual
expenditures (panel A) and predicted expenditures (panel B). The differences, reported in Panel
C, reveal two general findings. First, HAART had a positive effect on expenditures among
earlier award cohorts, from 1992 to 1995. This reflects increased expenditures due to fewer
program exits through death. Second, HAART had a negative effect on program expenditures
among later award cohorts, starting with the cohort in 1996. This decrease reflects fewer
applications and awards related to HIV. To calculate the net effect by 1999, the figures are
summed across all cohorts and years. Based on this calculation, HAART increased program
expenditures by $43.6 million.
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One important limitation of these estimates is that they do not account for program exit
through improved health and work capacity. If benefits had been terminated, then expenditures
in panel A would be overstated, and the estimates in panel C serve as upper bounds to the true
effects of HAART. However, the bounds in panel C may be close to HAART’s true effect, since
the effects of HAART on substantial gainful activity were limited (Table 5).

VII. Conclusion
This study examines the effect of health on SSDI outcomes. To identify health’s causal
effect, the analysis relies on an antiretroviral therapy introduced in late 1995 and early 1996 to
treat the human immunodeficiency virus. As research shows, the therapy immediately decreased
HIV-related mortality and increased the capacity and propensity to work. This study shows that
the new therapy substantially decreased HIV-applications and awards, but did not substantially
increase program exit for work among existing beneficiaries. In fact, the therapy effectively
increased benefit receipt by decreasing program exits through death, thereby increasing HIVrelated expenditures by 1999 by $43.6 million.
This study contributes to the literature on health and SSDI outcomes. Although several
studies report that SSDI outcomes are associated with poor health, these associations may be
biased measures of health’s causal effect. In contrast to related studies, this study adopts a
production function approach to identification, providing new insights into the causal effects of
health on SSDI outcomes.
The results suggest that improving population health may be effective at reducing the size
of the SSDI program. One policy option is to increase access to public health insurance and
health care, independent of employment status or SSDI receipt. By increasing health insurance,
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workers may be less inclined to apply for SSDI to qualify for Medicare coverage (Gruber and
Kubik 2002). Moreover, access to health care may improve population health and work
productivity, thereby decreasing the propensity to apply for and receive SSDI benefits.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics of SSDI Applicants related to HIV: Application Year 1994
Education
Less
than
High
High
School
School
College
All
All
Diploma Diploma Degree
A. SSDI Applicants
Age (years)
36.9
36.8
36.7
36.4
39.2
Male
88.3
87.6
83.8
87.3
95.2
Race: Black
34.0
36.4
45.9
36.8
18.3
Race: Other
13.9
12.0
18.8
10.3
9.3
Pre-application earnings ($1000)
14.7
14.3
8.1
13.9
26.4
Concurrent SSI
67.4
70.8
85.0
71.5
43.7
Primary HIV
92.1
91.4
89.2
91.7
93.4
Symptomatic HIV
83.9
82.5
74.1
83.4
92.2
Primary Symptomatic HIV
78.7
76.9
68.0
77.8
87.1
Award - initial
70.5
69.4
56.7
70.5
85.8
OHA appeal
12.3
12.6
17.0
12.4
6.4
Award - final
78.5
78.4
68.1
79.3
91.0
Death in one year
24.0
22.8
16.7
23.0
31.5
Death in two years
40.9
39.4
31.1
39.9
50.3
Observations
33225
27255
5895
17848
3512
Data on HIV-related applications come from Social Security’s Disability Research File. The data are
restricted to applicants who apply for benefit in 1994, who are ages 25 to 54, and who report HIV as the
primary or secondary. Pre-application earnings are calculated as the average annual earnings during the
three calendar years prior to the calendar year of application. All figures are in percentage points unless
otherwise noted.

Table 2
Change in HIV-related SSDI Applications: Years 1993, 1995, and 1997
1997

1993

1995

Predicted
Annual
Change

All

35636

31264

Pre-application earnings ($1000)
$0 to $10
$10 to $20
Greater than $20

17191
9157
9288

Concurrent SSI
SSDI singly

-2186

Predicted
(a)
26892

Actual
(b)
17435

Difference
(b)-(a)
-9457

Percent
Difference
[(b)-(a)]/(a)
-0.352

15097
7861
8306

-1047
-648
-491

13003
6565
7324

10304
4179
2952

-2699
-2386
-4372

-0.208
-0.363
-0.597

24108
11528

21358
9906

-1375
-811

18608
8284

12957
4478

-5651
-3806

-0.304
-0.459

Primary HIV
Secondary HIV

32811
2825

28861
2403

-1975
-211

24911
1981

15587
1848

-9324
-133

-0.374
-0.067

Symptomatic
Asymptomatic

30429
5207

26154
5110

-2138
-49

21879
5013

13693
3742

-8186
-1271

-0.374
-0.254

Primary Symptomatic HIV
28621
24503
-2059
20385
12456
-7929
-0.389
Primary Asymptomatic HIV
7015
6761
-127
6507
4979
-1528
-0.235
Data on HIV-related applications come from Social Security’s Disability Research File. The data are restricted to applicants who are ages 25 to 54
and who report HIV as the primary or secondary. Pre-application earnings are calculated as the average annual earnings during the three calendar
years prior to the calendar year of application.

Table 3
Linear Probability Model of SSDI Award
Variable
HAART
Year
Age 35 to 44
Age 45 to 54
Male
Black
Other
Earnings $10 to $20 thousand
Earnings greater than $20 thousand
Primary HIV
Symptomatic HIV
Death in one year
Death in two years

(1)
-4.5
(0.65)*
-5.0
(0.17)*

(2)
-0.22
(0.52)
-3.2
(0.14)*
0.61
(0.27)*
1.5
(0.38)*
2.5
(0.38)*
-3.9
(0.30)*
-10.2
(0.38)*
10.5
(0.31)*
14.3
(0.33)*
-19.1
(0.45)*
55.3
(0.36)*
4.7
(0.44)*
16.6
(0.39)*

Observations
86013
86013
Data on HIV-related applications come from Social Security’s Disability Research File. The data are
restricted to applicants who are ages 25 to 54 and who report HIV as the primary or secondary. The data
are also restricted to cases that were adjudicated in 1993, 1995, and 1997. Pre-application earnings are
calculated as the average annual earnings during the three calendar years prior to the calendar year of
application. State fixed-effects are included in the second model. Estimates are in percentage points. *
indicates significance at the 5 percent level.

Table 4
Summary Statistics of Primary HIV SSDI Beneficiaries
Year of Award
1995
1994
1993
1992
Age (years)
37.5
37.1
36.7
36.4
Male
89.1
90.5
90.7
91.5
Race: Black
31.1
29.4
29.2
27.6
Race: Other
12.5
12.4
12.4
12.1
Pre-application earnings ($1000)
17.3
17.1
16.2
16.0
Concurrent SSI
63.7
64.0
65.8
65.2
Primary HIV
91.1
91.7
92.3
91.8
Symptomatic HIV
97.0
96.6
95.8
94.0
Observations
22249
23360
26855
30427
Data on HIV-related applications come from Social Security’s Disability Research File. The data are
restricted to applicants who are ages 25 to 54, who report HIV as the primary or secondary, and who are
awarded benefits. Pre-application earnings are calculated as the average annual earnings during the three
calendar years prior to the calendar year of application. All figures are in percentage points unless
otherwise noted.

Table 5
Mortality and Earnings of new SSDI Beneficiaries Related to HIV by Year of and since Award
Deceased
Substantial Gainful Activity
Year of
Award
1995
1994
1993
1992
1995
1994
1993
1992
Year
since
Award
0
20.6
19.8
16.3
17.1
25.4
25.7
23.8
21.7
1
40.4
47.9
43.2
42.8
3.6
2.6
2.6
2.3
2
47.2
60.9
61.0
61.2
4.6
2.0
1.9
1.6
3
51.5
65.4
68.9
72.0
5.8
2.8
1.7
1.5
4
55.0
68.1
71.6
76.8
5.3
3.2
2.1
1.5
Data on HIV-related applications come from Social Security’s Disability Research File. The data are
restricted to applicants who are ages 25 to 54, who report HIV as the primary disability, and who are
awarded benefits. Substantial gainful activity, measured on an annualized basis , is an indicator of
program exit through work. All figures are in percentage points. The shaded region corresponds to
calendar years 1995 and earlier, before HAART was introduced.

Table 6
Mortality and Earnings of new SSDI Beneficiaries Related to HIV by Year of and since Award
Deceased
Substantial Gainful Activity
Year of
Award

1995

1994

1993

1992

1995

1994

1993

1992

6.8
2.1
3.6
4.7
4.0

6.0
1.4
1.7
2.7
3.2

5.2
1.6
1.7
1.7
2.3

4.8
1.3
1.5
1.7
1.7

25.2
3.4
5.3
6.7
6.1

25.8
2.7
2.4
3.2
3.6

24.0
2.7
2.1
2.1
2.4

2.2
2.4
1.9
1.7
1.6

A. Pre-Applications Earnings: $0 to $10 thousand
Year since
Award
0
1
2
3
4

17.4
36.4
43.6
48.3
52.4

15.6
42.3
55.6
60.4
63.3

12.7
35.4
53.1
61.4
64.7

12.3
34.3
52.3
63.9
69.7

B. Pre-Applications Earnings: $10 to $20 thousand
Year since
Award
0
1
2
3
4

20.8
41.0
47.7
51.8
55.0

20.5
48.4
61.8
66.9
69.7

16.0
44.6
63.6
71.8
74.3

17.7
44.1
63.6
74.8
79.1

C. Pre-Applications Earnings: Greater than $20 thousand
Year since
Award
0
24.1
24.1
22.1
23.5
46.2
47.9
48.4
45.1
1
44.3
53.8
52.5
53.5
5.4
3.8
3.9
3.6
2
50.9
66.1
69.4
71.5
5.3
2.0
1.8
1.6
3
54.8
69.8
76.3
80.9
6.4
2.4
1.4
1.0
4
57.9
72.1
78.4
84.7
6.0
3.0
1.5
0.9
Data on HIV-related applications come from Social Security’s Disability Research File. The data are
restricted to applicants who are ages 25 to 54, who report HIV as the primary disability, and who are
awarded benefits. Substantial gainful activity, measured on an annualized basis , is an indicator of
program exit through work. Pre-application earnings are calculated as the average annual earnings during
the three calendar years prior to the calendar year of application. All figures are in percentage points.
The shaded region corresponds to calendar years 1995 and earlier, before HAART was introduced.

Table 7
Actual and Predicted SSDI Expenditures related to HIV (in millions)
Year of Award
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
A. Actual Expenditures
Year since award
0
96.1
89.6
79.2
75.6
54.3
1
138.0 124.0 103.0 100.0
83.0
2
88.9
78.0
64.9
77.8
72.2
3
56.9
52.6
50.3
67.6
64.8
4
40.6
42.6
43.5
60.5
5
33.6
37.7
38.9
6
29.8
34.3
7
27.2
B. Predicted Expenditures
Year since award
0
96.1
1
138.0
2
88.9
3
56.9
4
36.4
5
23.3
6
14.9
7
9.5

89.6
124.0
78.0
49.9
31.9
20.4
13.1

79.2
103.0
65.9
42.2
27.0
17.3

75.6
98.3
62.9
40.3
25.8

69.6
90.4
57.9
37.0

1997

1998

1999

28.4
45.4
40.3

21.1
36.5

19.7

64.0
83.2
53.2

58.9
76.5

54.2

C. Actual Minus Predicted Expenditures
Year since award
0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-15.3
-35.6
-37.8
-34.5
1
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.7
-7.4
-37.8
-40.0
2
0.0
0.0
-1.0
14.9
14.3
-12.9
3
0.0
2.7
8.1
27.3
27.8
4
4.2
10.7
16.5
34.7
5
10.3
17.3
21.6
6
14.9
21.2
7
17.7
Data on HIV-related applications come from Social Security’s Disability Research File. The data are
restricted to applicants who are ages 25 to 54, who report HIV as the primary disability, and who are
awarded benefits. Actual expenditures are calculated from the monthly Primary Insurance Amount and
account for the month of award and exit through death. Predicted expenditures are calculated based on
assumptions described in the text. Expenditures are expressed in millions of dollars in 1994. The shaded
region corresponds to calendar years 1995 and earlier, before HAART was introduced.

60

Deaths (in thousands)

50
40
30
20
10
0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year

Figure 1: Deaths related to HIV/AIDS
The data come from the HIV Surveillance Report (CDC 2001).
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Figure 2: Applications for SSDI Disabled Worker Benefits
Data on HIV-related applications come from the 831 File. The file is restricted to applicants aged 25 to
54. Data on all SSDI applications come from the Social Security Administration (accessed
at www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table6c7.html on April 14, 2015).
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Figure 3: HIV-related Award Rates
Data on HIV-related applications come from the 831 File. The file is restricted to applicants aged 25 to
54. The award rates reflect the decision of the Disability Determination Services and, thus, do not
account for appeals. Data on all SSDI applications come from the Social Security Administration
(accessed at www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table6c7.html on April 14, 2015).

